(13)

No. 84-6811

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

WARREN McCLESKEY,

Petitioner,

—v.—

RALPH M. KEMP, Superintendent,
Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Center.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF *AMICI CURIAE* AND BRIEF *AMICI CURIAE* FOR DR. FRANKLIN M. FISHER, DR. RICHARD O. LEMPERT, DR. PETER W. SPERLICH, DR. MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, PROFESSOR HANS ZEISEL & PROFESSOR FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER WARREN McCLESKEY

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On Writ of Certiorari To The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICI CURIAE

Dr. Franklin M. Fisher, Dr. Richard O. Lempert, Dr. Peter W. Sperlich, Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Professor Hans Zeisel and Professor Franklin E. Zimring respectfully move, pursuant to Rule 36.3 of the Rules of the Court, for leave to file

the attached brief amici curiae in support of the petitioner in this case. The consent of counsel for petitioner has been obtained. The consent of counsel for respondent was requested but refused, necessitating this motion.

This case involves one of the most carefully studied criminal justice questions to come before the Court. At issue is research by Professor David Baldus and his colleagues on the influence of racial factors in the capital sentencing system of the State of Georgia. The underlying constitutional and policy questions are of great national concern, and the value of social science evidence is a central issue in the case.

Amici believe they could be of aid to the Court in the evaluation of: (i) the significance of the racial disparities reported in the Baldus studies and (ii) the validity of these studies. The competence

of amici to address these issues stems from their distinguished professional work in the areas of econometrics, statistics, research methodology and criminal justice issues.

Dr. Franklin M. Fisher is Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is one of the nation's foremost econometricians, having taught, written and consulted on a wide range of econometric and legal issues for over three decades. His article Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 702 (1980), has had a major influence on the judicial use of statistical methods. His research on sentencing guidelines and on the legal context of various economic issues has provided major empirical contributions to the fields of law and economics. He has served as a member of the National Academy of Sciences Panels on Deterrence and Incapacitation and on

Sentencing Research.

Dr. Richard O. Lempert is Professor of Law and Sociology at the University of Michigan. He has studied and written widely on a variety of legal and criminal justice issues, including capital punishment. He has served on the editorial boards of several distinguished professional journals including the Journal of Law and Human Behavior and Evaluation Review. Dr. Lempert has recently completed a term as the editor of Law & Society Review. His most recent book is An Invitation to Law and Social Science: Desert, Disputes and Distribution (1986). His work on jury size was cited by the Court in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).

Dr. Peter W. Sperlich is Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley. Dr. Sperlich has taught, consulted and published widely on

many criminal justice issues, including the role of juries and the use of scientific evidence in legal settings. His writings were cited prominently by the Court of Appeals in McCleskey v. Kemp.

Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang is Professor of Criminology and Criminal Law and Director of the Sellin Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law at the University of Pennsylvania. During his distinguished career, Dr. Wolfgang has made numerous contributions to the development of empirical research on legal issues. His pioneering study on the influence of racial factors in the imposition of death sentences for rape was the object of intensive legal examination during the Maxwell v. Bishop litigation of the 1960s. He is a former president of the American Society of Criminology.

Professor Hans Zeisel is Emeritus Professor of Law and Sociology and

Associate of the Center for Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Chicago. He is co-author of The American Jury, widely recognized as one of the most influential empirical studies of the legal system ever published. Professor Zeisel is a fellow of the American Statistical Association and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His empirical research on the functioning of juries was relied upon by this Court in Ballew v. Georgia, supra.

Professor Franklin E. Zimring is Professor of Law and Director of the Earl Warren Institute at Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley. He has written extensively on criminal justice issues, including juvenile crime and sentencing, the deterrent value of punishment, and the control of firearms. Professor Zimring served as Director of Research for the Task Force on Firearms of the National

Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, and has also served as consultant to many private and public organizations.

In view of their long-standing professional interest in the legal use of social scientific evidence and their extraordinary professional competence to address those issues, amici curiae believe that their views might be of assistance to the Court. They therefore urge the Court to grant their motion and permit the submission of this brief amici curiae.

Dated: New York, New York
August 29, 1986

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BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF DR. FRANKLIN M. FISHER, DR. RICHARD O. LEMPERT, DR. PETER W. SPERLICH, DR. MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, PROFESSOR HANS ZEISEL & PROFESSOR FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The factual questions presented by this case are among those that can be tested by established social science

methods. At issue was a series of decisions and actions carried out in a single state over a limited period of time. The sources of information about those decisions were, in this case, official state files containing unusually rich and detailed data. Statistical techniques for the analysis of such data are well-developed and reliable. There are established criteria in the social science professions for evaluating the findings of such studies. This is, in sum, the kind of research that social scientists know how to do, and to evaluate with considerable confidence.

The studies at issue in this case were conducted in the State of Georgia by Professors David Baldus, George Woodworth and Charles Pulaski. The results of the Baldus studies are that Georgia defendants whose victims are white, especially black defendants, face death-sentencing rates

many times higher than those whose victims are black. This result is consistent with a solid body of previous research in this area. A natural question provoked by such findings is whether other legitimate sentencing factors might explain what initially appear to be racial differences. Yet these striking results did not disappear after searching statistical analysis by Baldus and his colleagues. Neither chance nor any legitimate sentencing considerations can explain the powerful influence of these racial factors.

The Baldus studies were conducted in careful compliance with accepted research techniques. Their design and execution were meticulous and their analytical methods were appropriate. They are among the best empirical studies on criminal sentencing ever conducted, and their results are entitled to a high degree of confidence.

The lower courts nevertheless displayed a profound and unwarranted mistrust of the Baldus studies and a misunderstanding of their results. The District Court judged the Baldus data sources by unrealistic and unjustified standards. It quarreled with data collection and coding methods that are well-established and widely used. It evinced a hostility towards methods of statistical analysis -- especially multiple regression analysis -- that is utterly unwarranted, expressing a skepticism toward techniques of statistical modeling, especially analyses conducted with parsimonious models, that is uninformed and indefensible. Finally, it faulted Baldus's results on a variety of minor statistical grounds that reflect, at best, a partial understanding of the deficiencies that can afflict such research and a failure to appreciate the negligible extent to which

those problems were likely to affect the essential findings reported by Baldus. As a result of this series of errors, the District Court inappropriately devalued a first-rate body of research that sheds significant light on the issues before it.

The Court of Appeals, by contrast, purported to accept the validity of the Baldus studies and to address the legal implications of their results. Yet that court seriously underestimated the magnitude of the racial effects Baldus reported -- misconceiving both the actual size of the racial disparities and their relative significance as a force in Georgia sentencing decisions. Further, even while purportedly accepting the Baldus research, the Court of Appeals demanded a level of certainty that exceeds the powers of any statistical research to achieve -- a level of certainty not approached in most employment discrimination cases or in

business litigation where such statistical evidence is routinely received and often dispositive.

The Baldus results demonstrate that racial factors -- race of the defendant in white-victim cases and race of the victim throughout -- played a real, substantial and persistent role in death-sentencing decisions in the State of Georgia during the period studied. The disparities are so large that they lead to the conclusion that in black-defendant, white-victim cases-- of which petitioner McCleskey's is one-- it is more probable than not that the race of the victim was a determining factor, in the sense that the defendant would not have received a death sentence if his victim had not been white. The State's evidence did not contradict these strong findings, which replicate less detailed, though similar conclusions reached in other studies. Whatever the legal implications of these

facts, they should be accepted as proven to scientific satisfaction.

ARGUMENT

I

THE BALDUS STUDIES DEMONSTRATE THAT IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA, THE RACE OF THE HOMICIDE VICTIM HAS BEEN AN IMPLICIT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE WITH A SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON THE RATE OF CAPITAL SENTENCING

The unadjusted results reported by Professor Baldus for the sample of Georgia cases studied, grouped in combinations by race-of-defendant and race-of-victim, are as follows:

Table I

Death Sentences Among Defendants Convicted of Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter (DB63)

Race of Defendant / Victim	Number Receiving The Death Penalty	Percentage[1] Receiving The Death Penalty
black/white	50 of 223	22
white/white	58 of 748	8
black/black	18 of 1443	1
white/black	2 of 60	3

* * * * * * * * *

[1]Rounded to the nearest percentage point.

Table I (continued)

Totals by Victim	Number Receiving The Death Penalty	Percentage[2] Receiving The Death Penalty
white victim	108 of 981	11
black victim	20 of 1503	1

In particular, as the table shows, blacks who killed whites were sentenced to death at nearly 22 times the rate of blacks who killed blacks, and more than 7 times the rate of whites who killed blacks. The capital sentencing rate for all white-victim cases was almost 11 times the rate for all black-victim cases. Unless there is an extraordinarily perfect confounding with other factors correlated with race, these very large racial disparities

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[2]Rounded to the nearest percentage point.

indicate that race is an implicit aggravating factor in the capital sentencing decision.

To test whether the disparities in capital sentencing rates were due to factors confounded with race, Professor Baldus first made cross-tabulations, controlling for the most important sentencing factors that might have been confounders. In these tests, the racial disparities did not disappear. For example, by analyzing all cases that were death-eligible under statutory aggravating factor (b)(2)[3] -- murder by a defendant in the course of a contemporaneous felony, a category which included petitioner McCleskey's case -- Professor Baldus found that 38 percent (60 out of 160) of the blacks who murdered whites received the death penalty, while only 14 percent (15 out of 104) of the blacks who murdered

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[3]Former Ga. Code Ann. §27-2534.1(b)(2)

blacks received this penalty. (See DB 87) Thus, blacks who murdered whites were sentenced to death at more than 2.5 times the rate of black-on-black cases in this category.

When Professor Baldus separated out only those, like McCleskey, whose contemporary felony was armed robbery, the disparities were even more pronounced: 34 percent (42/123) of blacks who killed whites received a death sentence, while only 5 percent (3/57) of blacks who killed blacks did. (See DB 87). These cross-tabulations tell the basic story of the magnitudes of racial effects. Felony murders with white victims produce death sentences in Georgia more than twice as often as felony murders with black victims. Thus severe racial disparities in capital sentencing rates remain after controlling for the occurrence of contemporaneous felonies.

Other cross-tabular data from these studies not only establish the fact of racial discrimination but tell us where it occurs. They reveal noticeably different treatment of cases, by race, at various decision points from indictment forward. The following table, for example, addressing only Georgia cases in which a murder conviction had been obtained, reveals, by racial category, the rate at which Georgia prosecutors chose to advance cases to a capital sentencing hearing--where a death sentence was a possible outcome -- rather than permit an automatic life sentence.

Table 2

PENALTY TRIALS AMONG DEFENDANTS CONVICTED OF MURDER (DB94)

Defendant / Victim	Number Advancing to Penalty Trials	Percentage Advancing to Penalty Trials
black/white	87 of 124	.70
white/white	99 of 312	.32
black/black	38 of 250	.15
white/black	4 of 21	.19

Thus even among convicted black defendants, where strength of the evidence factors presumably no longer played a major role, Georgia prosecutors advanced black defendants to a penalty trial, if their victims were white, at nearly five times the rate they advanced black defendants whose victims were black (.70 vs. 15), and over three times the rate of whites who killed blacks (.70 vs. .19).

Because there were insufficient numbers of cases, Professor Baldus could not use cross-tabulations to control simultaneously for combinations of possible confounding factors. This is a common problem in social science research, and to deal with it, he resorted to multiple regression analysis, using both weighted least squares and logistic regression models. These are standard statistical

methods for this type of analysis[4]. Both forms of analysis showed substantial racial disparities in capital sentencing rates.

It is important to understand multiple regression analysis accurately as one tool for interpreting the data in the Baldus studies. The regression exercise was intended principally to check the basic finding of the cross-tabular approach against the possibility that multiple confounders which correlated with race might explain the racial disparities even if the principal ones taken separately did not do so. Multiple regression analysis

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[4]Multiple regression analysis is the method of choice when multiple causal factors may be at work and controlled experiments to isolate their separate impact are not possible or would not be credible. They have become an essential part of econometrics social science research, and more recently have been employed in anti-discrimination class actions, antitrust damage computations, and a variety of other legal contexts. The use of multiple regression was expressly approved by this Court in Bazemore v. Friday, ___ U.S. ___ (1986).

permitted Baldus to take over 230 factors simultaneously into account to see whether any combination of them might explain the racial disparities.[5] Among the regression results reported are many highly statistically significant regression coefficients for the race of the victim and the race of the defendant, employing statistical models of varying sizes. Based on those results, he found that white-victim cases remained more than twice as likely as black-victim cases to produce death sentences after controlling for all other factors. (See DB 83). These results demonstrate that racial factors have an independent influence on death-sentencing rates after the effects of all other legitimate sentencing variables included in

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[5]Professor Baldus testified that, in his judgment, a 39-variable model best captured the essence of the Georgia system (Fed. Tr. 808); he employed larger models as part of a comprehensive effort to see whether any other combinations of variables might eliminate the racial effects.

the models have been taken into account.

In its discussion of the magnitude of the average race-of-victim effect in Georgia's capital sentencing system, the Court of Appeals focused almost exclusively on what it styled a "6%" disparity. This figure was presumably derived from the .06 least squares regression coefficient estimated for the race-of-victim variable in the 230-variable large scale multiple regression model in the Baldus studies. (DB 83). The court, confusing percent and percentage point, interpreted this "6%" average disparity to mean that "a white victim crime is 6% more likely to result in the [death] sentence than a comparable black victim crime." McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 896 (11th Cir. 1985)(en banc). The assumption of the statement is that the death sentencing rate in white-victim cases would on average be 6% higher than the rate for similarly situated black-victim cases.

Thus, for example, if the death sentencing rate in a given class of black-victim cases were 10%, the white victim rate would be 6% higher or 10.6%.

Such an interpretation is incorrect and highly misleading. The .06 race of victim regression coefficient indicates that the average death-sentencing rate in the system is 6 percentage points higher in white-victim cases than it is in similarly situated black-victim cases. The percentage increase in the rate is much greater than 6 percent at all levels of aggravation where the death penalty is given, because the base rates are low.

Having misunderstood the basic results of the Baldus studies, the lower courts, not surprisingly, also misunderstood the implications of those results for McCleskey's case. To understand these implications, one has to focus on the disparity in sentencing rates at

aggravation levels comparable to those in McCleskey's case. One can do this by looking at disparities in capital sentencing rates at the average aggravation levels for all white-victim cases (of which McCleskey's is one) or, more precisely, at the cases in the mid-range of aggravation (of which McCleskey's is also one). We examine both below.

The overall death-sentence rate in white-victim cases is 11%. Since the weighted least squares regression model cited by the Court of Appeals tells us that the overall rate in comparably aggravated black-victim cases is six percentage points less, the rate in such cases is estimated at five percent. Thus, at the average level of aggravating circumstances represented by the white-victim cases, the rate of capital sentencing in a white-victim case is 120% greater than the rate in a black-victim case. Or to state the results

differently: in six out of every 11 death penalty cases in which the victim was white, race-of-victim was a determining aggravating factor in the sense that the defendants would not have received the death penalty if the victims had been black.

The Court of Appeals properly points out that the race-of-victim effect is concentrated at the mid-range, where it is approximately 20 percentage points. In that range, the average death sentencing rates (calculated from DB 90: col. D, levels 3-7) is 14.4% for black-victim cases and 34.4% for white-victim cases, an increase of 139%. This means that out of every 34 death-penalty cases in the mid-range in which the victims were white, 20 defendants would not have received the death penalty if their victims had been black.

McCleskey's case is, a white-victim

death penalty case that is in the mid-range in terms of aggravating facts. Since the statistical results show that in a majority of such cases the death penalty would not have been imposed if the victim were black, one must conclude that in McCleskey's case (as in others of the same class) it is more likely than not that the victim's race was a decisive aggravating factor in the imposition of the death penalty. Thus it is more likely than not that McCleskey would not have received a death sentence if his victim had been black.

II

THE BALDUS STUDIES EMPLOYED EXCELLENT, PROFESSIONAL METHODS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCED STRONG, RELIABLE FINDINGS ON THE ROLE OF RACE IN GEORGIA'S CAPITAL SENTENCING SYSTEM

The District Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, appear to have rejected the Baldus studies in large measure because of their misapprehensions about the quality

of the data gathered or the statistical methods employed to analyze that data. In our opinion, these reservations are unwarranted: the design of the research followed accepted scientific practice, the work was carried out in a careful and thorough manner, the analytic methods were appropriate -- and the results, consequently, are reliable.

The District Court's opinion, in particular, raised a series of objections to empirical methods and procedures, almost none of which is well-founded. It asserts that Baldus's data base was "substantially flaw[ed]," McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 360 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (emphasis omitted), because it "could not capture every nuance of every case." Id. at 356. None of Baldus's many models, even those with over 230 variables, was deemed sufficiently inclusive in the District Court's eyes, since "the final data base

was far from perfect." Id.

These objections are fundamentally misplaced. As a scientific matter, the likelihood that any omitted variable could significantly affect Baldus's robust findings -- especially when so many legitimate variable were taken into account -- is negligible.[6] For any unaccounted-for variable actually to make a difference in the Baldus findings, it would have to be substantially correlated with the race of the victim and yet substantially uncorrelated with the 230 variables defined by Professor Baldus that take into account every known, conceptually important legal and extra-legal factor that might affect capital sentencing. It is extremely unlikely that any factor that powerful has been overlooked in these studies. The

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[6]We use the term "robust" to indicate that Professor Baldus's findings do not appear to be significantly affected by variations in the specifications of the statistical models he used.

examples given by the lower court--including "looks, age, personality," see 753 F.2d at 899 -- either were in fact included in Baldus' analyses or appear unlikely to meet those qualifications. By insisting on a standard of "absolute knowledge" about every single case, the District Court implicitly rejected the value of all applied statistical analysis. Yet, as this Court has correctly pointed out in Bazemore, a complainant need only include the major variables in his analysis.

The District Court also expressed general skepticism toward a range of well-established social scientific methods employed by Baldus, including multiple regression analysis, which it found "ill suited to provide the court with circumstantial evidence of the presence of discrimination." Id. at 372 (emphasis omitted). Indeed the only statistical

method that the District Court did seem to approve is the simple cross-tabular approach, id. at 354, even though the court acknowledged that the inherent nature of the problem under study here makes it "impossible to get any statistically significant results in comparing exact cases using a cross tabulation method." Id. (emphasis omitted). This preference for cross-tabular methods lacks any scientific foundation. Baldus's use of multiple regression analysis is clearly valid and appropriate to his data. In any event, Baldus and his colleagues did use cross-tabular analysis extensively, and their findings using this method, as we have seen, are fully consistent with the regression results.

Finally, in evaluating Baldus's results, the District Court seized upon a somewhat confused welter of statistical issues, including Baldus's conventions for

coding "unknown" data, id. at 357-59, the possible multicollinearity of his variables, id. at 363-64, and the reported R^2 of his model, id. at 351, 361, as reasons for its ultimate conclusion that Baldus's results could not be accepted. However, Baldus and his colleagues satisfactorily addressed each of these concerns and demonstrated that the racial results were not adversely affected by them. Baldus not only employed the correct method of treating "unknowns"; he also conducted alternative analyses to demonstrate that racial influences persisted irrespective of the method of treatment adopted. Multicollinearity undoubtedly did affect some of the larger models employed by Baldus, but the District Court failed to realize that multicollinearity would not change the estimate of the reported racial results, but would only enlarge the standard error

of that estimate. The standard errors were calculated in the usual way in the Baldus studies (which reflects the effects of multicollinearity) and as thus calculated, they did not deprive Baldus's results of statistical significance. Finally, the court's concern with the reported R^2 of Baldus's models is unfounded. Apart from the irrelevance of the R^2 measure for logistic models, an R^2 of .40 or higher is quite acceptable for the weighted least-squares models.

In sum, since the District Court's opinion was flawed by basic statistical errors and misunderstandings, its evaluation of the validity of the Baldus studies is simply off-target.

* * *

The Court of Appeals took a different approach to Baldus's research: it announced that it would "assum[e] [the study's] validity and that it proves what

it claims to prove," McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d at 886, and would base its judgment solely on the legal consequences flowing from that research. Yet the skepticism that pervaded the District Court's analysis continued to dominate the treatment of Baldus's research by the Court of Appeals. After first knitting together citations from several scholarly articles that caution courts against an unreflective use of social scientific evidence, id. at 887-90, the court announced "that generalized statistical studies are of little use in deciding whether a particular defendant has been unconstitutionally sentenced to death . . . [and] at most are probative of how much disparity is present." Id. at 893. That observation misses the point: Statistical evidence can determine with great reliability whether racial factors are playing a role in the sentencing system as a whole and whether

the disparities are so great as to tip the balance of probability that they operated in any particular case. Baldus's studies provide just such evidence.

When the Court turns to the Baldus studies, it relies primarily upon one summary figure drawn from the entire body of results -- a reported .06 disparity by race of victim in overall death-sentencing rates. As we showed above, this was but one of a number of important, meaningful results indicating a consistent racial presence in the state of Georgia's capital sentencing system. More important, as also demonstrated earlier, the Court of Appeals seemed fundamentally to have misunderstood the magnitude and significance even of this single result upon which it focused: it took a pound for a penny.

Although Baldus and his colleagues have been consistently conservative in

evaluating and reporting their findings, the adjusted influence of racial factors on Georgia's capital sentencing system remains both clear and significant. Race, especially the race of the victim, plays a large and recognizable part in determining who among Georgia defendants convicted of murder will be sentenced to life and who among them will be sentenced to death.

CONCLUSION

The contributions of social scientific evidence to the resolution of legal issues has increased significantly in recent decades, as statistical methods have improved and the confidence of the courts has grown. This Court has led the lower federal courts toward an appreciation of the nature of statistical evidence, and has developed legal principles -- including standards of proof for parties presenting

such evidence -- that reflect a clear understanding of the powerful utility of valid social scientific evidence. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, ___U.S.___, ___L.Ed.2d___,(1986); Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); see also Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank, 505 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Tex. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984).

The Court of Appeals disregarded these basic standards of proof fashioned by the Court. Its opinion in McCleskey insists upon a level of methodological purity in data quality, model design, and analysis that cannot be achieved and is unnecessary. If such standards were to prevail, the effect would be to choke off the use of scientific methods of social research in law. Perceptions of the

judicial system and society would still inform judicial decisions, but they would be controlled by anecdote and hunch. Surely the courts can and should do better than that, particularly in cases, such as this one, that involve issues of deep social concern.

The cross-tabular and regression analyses of Professor Baldus and his colleagues were the correct analytical tools for the research they undertook. Their studies were undertaken with great care. Their findings replicate the work of earlier, less comprehensive studies. The magnitude of their findings is striking. This body of research renders it far more likely than not that racial factors have played a significant role in Georgia's capital sentencing system in the post-Furman era.

Dated: New York, New York
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a member of the bar of this Court, and that I served the annexed Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae on the parties by placing copies in the United States mail, first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

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Done this ____ day of August, 1986.

_____
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